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Over the last decade, the Brazilian banking industry has undergone major and deep 
transformations with several privatizations of state-owned banks, mergers and 
acquisitions, closing down of troubled banks, entry by foreign banks, etc. The purpose 
of this paper is to evaluate the impacts of these changes in banking on total factor 
productivity. We first obtain measures of bank level productivity by employing the 
techniques due to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). We then relate such measures to a set of 
bank characteristics. Our main results indicate that state-owned banks are less 
productive than their private peers, and that privatization has increased productivity. 
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  The banking system in Brazil is the largest and the most complex one in Latin 
America. Like in many parts of the world, the banking industry in Brazil is undergoing 
a process of rapid and radical transformations. The common features of this process, in 
Brazil and elsewhere, include: an increase in competition from within the industry as 
well as from the outside; a wave of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities, including 
several cross-border deals; more globalized capital markets with highly volatile capital 
flows, which are capable of causing havoc in some national financial sectors; new 
financial products, with increasing reliance on off-balance sheet activities; new banking 
practices brought out by the information technology revolution. 
  The banking sector in Brazil has been strongly influenced by the changing 
domestic macroeconomic scene of the recent period, especially by the transition from a 
high to a low inflation environment. After many years of making a living out of 
inflationary rents, this transition was far from smooth for many banks. 
Among those most affected by the many changes in the industry were the state-
owned banks. Due to their poor performance, many of the state-owned banks in Brazil 
were either closed down or privatized. Less than half (14) of the 32 state-owned banks 
operating in the country by 1994 were still active by 2002. 
The Brazilian experience represents an interesting case study on bank 
privatization not only because of its quantitative relevance but also due to the varied 
options given to the state-owned banks following their restructuring. Thus, some state-
owned banks were straight privatized by their controllers (namely, the Brazilian states) 
whereas some others had their control first transferred from the states to the federal 
government and then privatized. Some other states also kept the control of their banks 
after restructuring. There are also some other state-owned banks that were just 
liquidated. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the privatization of state-
owned banks on productivity. Measures of bank-level total factor productivity are first 
obtained as the residuals from a production function estimate. The production function 
is estimated following the methodology suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to 
try to control for endogeneity problems arising from the simultaneous choice of inputs 
and productivity by the bank firm.    3
In a second stage, bank total factor productivity is related to a set of control 
variables. In an environment where many different types of corporate control changes 
are occurring simultaneously, it is important to try to control for as many of them as 
possible even though the primary interest of the paper lies on the effects of bank 
privatization. This is certainly the case for Brazil whereby privatization of state-owned 
banks were taking place alongside other corporate changes in the industry like domestic 
mergers and acquisitions, foreign acquisition of domestic banks, liquidation of banks, 
and pure exit from the market. We therefore follow the methodology proposed by 
Berger et al. (2003) and include variables controlling for static, selection, and dynamic 
effects. Static variables are dummies for groups of banks that have not had any 
corporate change over the sample period. Selection variables are dummies for groups of 
banks that have had some corporate change over the sample period. Such dummy 
variables are equal to one over the whole sample period for the corresponding banks. 
Dynamic variables are of two forms. A first set of dynamic variables are dummies for 
those banks that have had some corporate change over the sample period taking the 
value one only for the time periods following the change. A second set of dynamic 
variables track the number of time periods following the change. In addition to the 
static, selection, and dynamic variables we also included a set of dummy variables for 
those banks that have exited the market. Exit can occur either because the bank has been 
liquidated or because the bank has changed the nature of its activities. 
Our main results show that state-owned banks are less productive than private-
owned ones. Brazilian state-owned banks face severe agency problems due to their use 
for political, and social purposes. Another main result of the paper is that privatization 
has had a positive impact on productivity. Moreover, the positive effects of privatization 
seem to take some time to materialize. Privatization proved also to be a superior 
strategy than restructuring and keeping the bank under state control. On the other hand, 
we could not find any strong performance differences related to the way a state-owned 
bank was privatized (i.e., straight privatization or federalization followed by 
privatization). 
This paper contributes to the literature on bank productivity. The study of bank 
productivity is relevant because productivity is a summary performance measure. Thus, 
productivity analysis may be relevant to those involved in bank M&A issues, like bank 
practitioners or bank competition authorities. Also, to the extent that low productivity 
can work as an early warning, bank supervision authorities may use productivity   4
measures as an additional monitoring instrument. Bank productivity studies are also 
useful due to the well-documented evidence that a bank system that efficiently channels 
available resources to productive uses is a powerful mechanism for economic growth 
[Levine (1997)]. 
This paper is also related to the literature on bank privatization. The empirical 
literature in this area takes the form of either cross-country studies or analyses of 
individual countries.
1 This literature provides broad support to the conclusions reached 
in this paper on the poorer performance of state-owned banks and on the beneficial 
impacts of bank privatization. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the 
banking industry in Brazil, with a special emphasis on the state-owned sector. Section 3 
describes the methodology to be applied in the empirical sections. Section 4 discusses 
data-related issues. Section 5 estimates the coefficients of a production function, from 
which the bank-level productivity measures are calculated. Section 6 studies the 
determinants of bank productivity, highlighting the role played by bank privatization. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Overview of the banking sector in Brazil 
 
The launching of the stabilization plan, called the Real Plan, in July 1994 with 
the subsequent transition to an environment of more stable prices proved to be very 
costly to the Brazilian banks. During the high-inflation period, banks could profit from 
inflation transfers. Inflation imposes a tax over the holders of money and non-interest 
bearing deposits. As issuers of demand deposits, commercial banks receive part of the 
inflation tax. According to ANDIMA-IBGE (1997), the inflationary transfers to the 
banking system fell from an average of 3.4% of GDP in the 1990-93 period to 1.8% in 
1994, and to 0.03% in 1995. 
In the immediate aftermath of the stabilization plan, Brazilian banks tried to 
make up for the inflationary losses by increasing credit. Total loans of the financial 
                                                 
1 Boehmer et al. (2003), Bonin et al. (2003), Otchere (2003), and Nguyen and Williams (2003) are 
examples of cross-country studies. Some studies focusing on individual countries are, among others, 
Berger et al. (2003) for Argentina, Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill (2003) for Brazil, Beck, Cull, and 
Jerome (2003) for Nigeria, Haber and Kantor (2003) for Mexico, Omran (2003) for Egypt, and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy (2003) for Pakistan. Megginson (2003) and Clarke et al. (2003) provide 
comprehensive surveys about bank privatization studies.   5
system went up 43.7% after the first eight months of the stabilization plan. The rapid 
increase in the concession of loans was not followed by a careful consideration of the 
risk characteristics of those seeking credit. When the Central Bank dramatically 
increased the reserve requirements on deposits in the second half of 1994, coupled with 
the continuation of a policy of high interest rates, a credit retrenchment followed. Non-
performing loans started to accumulate fast. 
With the imminent insolvency of some big private banks
2 a bailout mechanism 
was put in place in November 1995
3. Under this program, the Central Bank was given 
the mandate to compel a fragile bank to: a) increase its capital, or b) to transfer its 
shareholder control, or c) to be merged or acquired by another bank. PROER made 
easier for stronger financial institutions to acquire weaker ones by allowing the 
acquiring financial institutions to record as a premium the difference between the 
acquisition value and the market value of the acquired institution. Non-performing loans 
were recognized as losses and, under certain conditions, the premium could be used as a 
tax credit. It also allowed forbearance in the form of a temporary waive of the Basle 
minimum capital requirement for the ailing participants. In order to reduce the moral 
hazard problems associated to bailout schemes, PROER set out that banks could only 
qualify for official help when the ownership control was agreed to be transferred to 
some other institution. Seven banking institutions were restructured under the PROER 
resources. 
The PROER program only reached private banks. A similar program aiming at 
the state-owned banks was launched in August 1996, the PROES
4. The aim of this 
program was not only to reduce the participation of the Brazilian states (provinces) in 
the banking activity but also to address their chronic public debt problems
5. Debt 
restructuring packages were offered to those states who agreed to give one of the 
following destinations to their banks: a) to liquidate it; b) to privatize it; c) to transfer its 
control to the federal government for future privatization, or, d) to transform it in a 
                                                 
2 In August 1995, Banco Economico, the eight largest in the country by net worth, fell under Central 
Bank intervention. In November 1995, the same fate hit Banco Nacional, the sixth largest in the country 
by net worth. 
3 Program of Incentives to the Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial System, 
PROER. 
4 Program of Incentives to the Reduction of the State-Level Public Sector in the Bank Activity. See also 
Baer and Nazmi (2000), and Ness Jr. (2000) for more details. 
5 The two problems were not unrelated: state-level banks were the main purchasers of the public bonds 
issued by their main shareholders, the states themselves. Werlang and Fraga Neto (1995) study the role of 
state-owned banks in the creation of public debt. Bevilaqua (2000) describes state debt developments 
from the mid-1980s onwards, with special emphasis on the 1997 state debt bailout.   6
development agency. Less favorable financial packages were also offered to those states 
that still wanted to keep their banks after bailing them out. 
When PROES was launched, there were 35 financial institutions under the 
control of the Brazilian states, including 23 commercial banks. With the exception of 
the states of Mato Grosso do Sul, Tocantins (which had no financial institutions under 
their control), Paraíba, and Distrito Federal, all the other state units joined PROES. 
Under PROES, ten financial institutions were/are being liquidated, six banks were 
privatized by the states, six banks were/are being privatized by the federal government, 
sixteen financial institutions were transformed into development agencies, and five 
banks were restructured and kept under the state control
6. 
PROES only reached the banks owned by the states. For the banks owned by the 
federal government, an official restructuring program was launched in June 2001, the 
PROEF
7. Under this program, many troubled assets were transferred to a newly created 
institution under the Finance Ministry control. Three federal government-owned banks 
(CEF, BNB, and Basa) also received capital injection
8. 
The whole set of measures put in place drastically changed the ownership 
composition of the banking sector in the country. Tables 1 and 2 document such 
changes along several dimensions. 
 
TABLE 1 Number of Commercial Banks by Ownership
Private Minority Control Number of
Year Domestic Foreign Foreign Public TOTAL Privatizations
1994 146 31 37 32 246
1995 142 32 36 32 242
1996 130 29 40 32 231
1997 119 26 45 27 217 1
1998 105 17 58 23 203 3
1999 96 12 67 19 194 1
2000 93 13 69 17 192 3
2001 82 14 70 16 182 1
2002 75 10 56 14 155 2  
 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 1 for a list of all banks included in the study with the identification of their corporate 
status. 
7 Program for the Strengthening of the Federal Financial Institutions. 
8 Banco do Brasil (BB), another federal government-owned bank, was capitalized by the Treasury back in 
1995.   7
The number of commercial banks operating in Brazil has been reducing since 
1994. There were 91 fewer banks working in the country in 2002 than in 1994. Apart 
from foreign controlled banks, all the other bank segments showed considerable 
reductions in their numbers. Even for foreign controlled banks, the year 2002 
represented a reversal of the trend when, after many years of continuing expansion, their 
number showed a reduction. 
 
Private Private Private Private
Year Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic
1993 48.47 7.32 44.21 40.72 8.36 50.92 38.85 4.84 56.32 31.55 6.57 61.88
1994 56.03 9.64 34.33 41.29 7.17 51.53 39.41 4.59 56.00 35.47 5.20 59.34
1995 49.93 13.27 36.80 39.25 8.41 52.34 36.48 5.41 58.11 31.93 5.75 62.32
1996 56.03 10.42 33.55 39.12 9.82 51.06 34.18 4.37 61.45 32.91 8.70 58.39
1997 52.64 14.51 32.85 36.90 12.87 50.24 33.01 7.58 59.42 35.61 11.80 52.59
1998 50.55 22.21 27.23 35.47 18.47 46.06 33.28 15.23 51.49 31.26 15.02 53.72
1999 47.55 25.93 26.53 33.33 23.34 43.33 32.07 16.93 50.99 32.03 19.98 48.00
2000 51.35 28.88 19.76 35.50 27.62 36.88 34.28 21.36 44.36 34.96 25.48 39.56
2001 52.19 31.35 16.45 37.55 30.13 32.32 35.80 20.41 43.79 42.82 32.03 25.15
2002 49.74 33.62 16.64 37.32 27.67 35.01 37.16 20.13 42.71 40.45 30.48 29.07
ASSETS
Foreign Public










9 shows that private domestic banks managed to keep their share of the 
bank system net worth, assets, and deposits. This group of banks even increased their 
share of the bank system loans. 
Foreign controlled banks increased significantly their market penetration in the 
country. In 2002, they accounted for 33.6% of the bank system net worth, 27.7% of the 
bank system assets, 20.1% of the bank system deposits, and 30.5% of the bank system 
loans. 
Despite the great reduction in the importance of the state-owned banks, they still 
account for significant shares of the bank system net worth (16.6%), assets (35%), 





  Productivity is defined as any variation in output that cannot be explained by 
variations in inputs. On this account, productivity changes can be due either to 
variations in efficiency or to changes in technology. 
                                                 
9 In table 2, the foreign minority group is incorporated into the private domestic group.   8
The methodology to be applied in this paper follows Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003)’ extension to the approach developed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Olley and 
Pakes’ methodology allows one to consistently estimate the coefficients of a production 
function taking into consideration two possible sources of bias, namely a sample 
selection and a simultaneity bias. 
The sample selection bias refers to the fact that many firms may have left the 
market during the sample period. It is reasonable to imagine that the unobservable 
productivity variable and the decision to leave the market are correlated, causing a 
potential sample selection problem. The simultaneity problem is related to the 
correlation between the unobservable productivity variable and the amount of inputs 
chosen by the bank. The selection problem is handled by modeling the exit decision by 
the firm. The simultaneity problem is solved by inverting an investment function, which 
is affected by the unobserved productivity.  
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) introduced an important improvement in the Olley 
and Pakes’ methodology by making use of an intermediate input instead of investment 
as a proxy variable for productivity. Investment can only work as a valid proxy if it does 
not take zero values, which can be a very restrictive condition for the data sets typically 
found in developing countries. 
Levinsohn and Petrin also argue that the monotonicity condition required for the 
inversion of the investment function may not be valid due to capital adjustment costs. 
The monotonicity condition for investment is then replaced by an equivalent 
requirement for an intermediate input function. The authors choose electricity as the 
productivity proxy on the account that all firms need such input. Moreover, in their 
sample, there was no firm producing or selling electricity, which can be interpreted as 
an impossibility for storing such input, making it highly correlated with 
contemporaneous productivity levels. 
The procedure to be adopted in the estimation can be illustrated taking the 
example of a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
it it it e it l it k 0 it η ω e β l β k β β y + + + + + =      (1) 
 
where yit is the log of the output of firm i in period t, kit is the log of its capital stock, lit 
is the log of its labor input,  it e  is its electricity usage,  it ω  is its productivity, and  it η    9
is an error stochastic term. Notice that both ω  and η  are not observed by the 
econometrician. The difference between them is that ω is a state variable in the firm 
decision problem and therefore it affects the demand for inputs, while η  has no such 
implication. 
  Levinsohn and Petrin propose a two-step procedure to estimate the coefficients 
of (1) taking into consideration the simultaneity problem.
10 In order to implement the 
first step, the inversion of the demand for electricity function, which is supposed to be 
strictly increasing in ω , allows one to write: 
 
) , ( t t t t k e h = ω      (2) 
 
  Equation (2) expresses the unobserved productivity variable as a function of 
observable variables. By replacing (2) in (1) it is possible therefore to control for ω  in 
the estimation: 
 
it it it t it l it k e l y η ϕ β + + = ) , (       (3) 
where: 
 
) k , e ( h k e ) k , e ( it it t it k it e it it t + + + ≡ β β β ϕ 0   (4) 
 
  The “partially linear” model (3)-(4) is a semiparametric regression model. The 
first step in the estimation allows the identification of the variable input coefficient  l β , 
but it does not allow the identification of the fixed input and of the electricity 
coefficients,  k β  and  e β , respectively. 
  The second step aims at estimating such coefficients. It begins with the 
assumption that productivity follows a first-order Markov process: 
 
[] 1 t it it t 1 t t t 1 t 1 t ξ k , e h g ξ ω g ω ω ω + + + + + + = + = ξ + = )] ( [ ) ( E 1 t    (5) 
 
                                                 
10 Unlike Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) do not account for the sample selection 
bias. Levinsohn and Petrin argue that the use of unbalanced panels controls, to some extent, for such bias. 
Moreover, both Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (1999) found that controlling for 
selection has little effect on the final parameter estimates.   10
where  1 + t ξ  is the innovation in  1 + t ω . 
Lagging (5) one period, and replacing the result in (3), one obtains: 
 
[] it it it k it e it it t it k
it e it it it t it k it e it l it
k e ) k , e ( g k
e ) k , e ( h k e l y
η ξ β β β ϕ β
β β η β β β β
+ + − − − + +
+ + = + + + + = −
− − − − − 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0    (6) 
 
Expression (6) requires the knowledge of  1 − t ϕ , which can be estimated in the 
first-step. Equation (6) is then used to estimate  e β  and  k β  by non-linear least squares. 
  
 
4. Data and sample 
 
The empirical section of the paper aims at estimating a Cobb-Douglas 
production function having a measure of bank output as the dependent variable and 
three productive inputs as explanatory variables. 
The inputs are labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. Following Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003), a separate intermediate input is used as a proxy variable for productivity. 
Unlike the manufacturing sector, however, the use of electricity as a proxy variable in 
the banking industry does not seem to be warranted. We therefore take communications 
as our proxy for the unobserved productivity. Other intermediate inputs are the sum of 
water, electricity, and gas bill costs, maintenance costs, non-durable goods acquisition 
costs, data processing costs, and transport costs. 
Capital stock includes premises, equipment, other fixed assets, and rented/leased 
premises and equipment. It is net of depreciation. Capital stock is treated as a fixed 
input since adjustment costs may prevent instantaneous reallocations of such input. 
Thus, beginning-of-period values of capital stock are used in the estimations. As for 
labor, we treat it alternatively as a variable and as a fixed factor.
11 
Measurement of bank output is more controversial, with many approaches being 
proposed in the literature
12. Here, output is measured as the value of total bank working 
assets (total assets less fixed assets), making our model consistent with the 
                                                 
11 Labor economists in Brazil argue that, due to rigid labor market legislation, dismissal of labor force is 
very costly. Such friction can prevent instantaneous reallocations of the labor input making it behave as a 
fixed factor. 
12 See, among others, Berger and Humphrey (1992), and Fixler and Zieschang (1992).   11
intermediation approach. Haynes and Thompson (1999) use a similar procedure. Some 
empirical studies use bank deposits either as output or as input of the bank activity. 
However, because of the relevance of bank deposits in the liability side of a bank 
balance sheet, the inclusion of them would cause a serious problem in the estimation of 
the production function, due to the accounting identity equating total assets and total 
liabilities. In the present study therefore bank deposits are not included in the bank 
production process. 
We also report results for a broader measure of output, attempting to take into 
consideration off balance sheet activities by the banks. We proxy such activities by the 
total income of services, and we add them to total bank working assets. 
The source of the accounting data is COSIF (Accounting Plan of the National 
Financial System Institutions), elaborated by the Brazilian Central Bank, and by which 
all the financial institutions operating in the country have to report balance sheet and 
income statements on a monthly basis. The accounts for (end of) June and (end of) 
December of each year during the period from December 1990 to December 2002 were 
used. Constant values were obtained deflating the nominal values through the evolution 
of the IGP-DI, the general price index calculated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). 
All constant values were converted to December 2002 values. 
The sample is unbalanced with 242 commercial banks. All the observations with 
zero values for the output or for one of the inputs were excluded from the analysis. In 
addition, banks with less than three observations, and outliers were also excluded. The 
final sample contains 4,444 observations
13. Table 6 in Appendix 2 shows some 
descriptive statistics for the sample variables. 
 
 
5. Estimation of bank productivity 
 
This section implements Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology to obtain 
measures of productivity for a sample of Brazilian banks. In the next section, the bank-
level productivity measures so obtained are regressed on a number of control variables, 
                                                 
13 The criterion employed to eliminate the outliers was the following: initially, the ratios of output to 
labor, of output to capital, and of output to intermediate inputs were computed for all the valid 
observations. The observations in the lower 0.5% and in the upper 0.5% for each of the three ratios were 
excluded from the sample.   12
including, among them, dummy variables representing privatization of state-owned 
banks. 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) modify Olley e Pakes (1996) approach in two 
ways. First, they replace investment by electricity as a proxy variable for productivity. 
Second, they do not model the exit decision by the bank. For the sample of Brazilian 
banks, troubled banks stop reporting employment levels to the Central Bank, which 
preclude us to implement the second step in Olley and Pakes algorithm. As Levinshohn 
and Petrin argue, we hope that the use of unbalanced panel data helps to reduce the 
sample selection bias. 
The first step of the algorithm involves the estimation of the following “partially 
linear” equation: 
 
it t it it t it k it c it i it l it time ) k , c ( h k c i l y ε β β β β β + + + + + + + = 0    (7) 
 
where  it y  is the log of bank output,  it l  is the log of labor,  it i  is the log of other 
intermediate inputs,  it c  is the log of communications,  it k  is the log of capital,  t time  is a 
trend variable, and  it ε  is the random error term.  
The  ) k , c ( h it it t  function is estimated by means of a polynomial series expansion 
where terms of up to the fourth degree of  it c  and  it k  are used. This series expansion is 
separately estimated for three different sub-periods: from 1990 to June 1994, from 
December 1994 to 1997, and from 1998 to 2002. In equation (7) labor is considered as a 
variable factor. We also estimated models where labor is treated as a fixed factor. When 
this is the case, labor is also incorporated in the polynomial series expansion. 
The first step of the estimation allows one to obtain consistent estimates of the 
variable factor coefficients,  l β  and  i β . Once these coefficients are obtained, we 








it i l y y β β − − =        (8) 
 
This term is then regressed on a polynomial series in  ) k , c ( it it . The fitted value 
from this regression is denoted  ) k , c ( ˆ it it t ϕ .   13
In the second step, consistent estimates for  c β  and  k β  are obtained through 
non-linear least squares applied to: 
 
[ ] it it it k it c it it t it k it c
p
it k c ) k , c ( ˆ g k c y ε ξ β β β ϕ β β β + + − − − + + + = − − − − − 1 1 0 1 1 1 0  (9) 
 
where  it ξ  is the innovation term in productivity. 
Table 3 presents the production function coefficients estimated through the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (L-P) algorithm, alongside the coefficients obtained through least 












ln (labor) -0.0479* -0.0476* -0.0750*** -0.0748*** 0.4409*** 0.4384***
(-1.90) (-1.89) (-3.30) (-3.30) (4.17) (4.41)
ln (other intermediate) 0.2599*** 0.2602*** 0.2137*** 0.2139*** 0.4391*** 0.4393***
(9.03) (9.06) (8.21) (8.25) (19.74) (19.82)
ln (communications) 0.6162*** 0.6159*** 0.6119*** 0.6205*** 0.2047*** 0.20436***
(22.94) (23.02) (8.68) (9.61) (4.80) (4.22)
ln (capital) 0.0236 0.0241 0.0515* 0.0432 0.064 0.0651
(1.50) (1.54) (1.89) (1.54) (1.07) (1.13)
time 0.0482*** 0.0483*** 0.0379*** 0.0378*** 0.0546*** 0.0547***
(20.96) (21.08) (6.06) (6.08) (8.24) (8.29)
Observations
t-statistic in parentheses; *,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
L-P are the estimates using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach.
4444 4202 4202
TABLE 3 - Estimates of production function parameters 
Least Squares L-P -  variable labor L-P  -  fixed labor
 
 
The estimated coefficients are quite robust to the use of different measures of 
output. The labor coefficients in the least squares estimations are negative, and 
marginally significant. When labor is treated as a variable factor in the L-P approach, its 
coefficient becomes even more negative and highly significant this time. The last two 
columns of Table 3 show the estimates of the L-P approach when labor is treated as a 
fixed factor. This model shows more reasonable values for the estimated coefficients, 
although the statistical significance of the capital stock coefficient is still low
15. Thus, 
                                                 
14 The standard errors of the coefficients for the fixed inputs and for communications in the L-P models 
were obtained by bootstrap resampling 100 times. There are fewer observations in the L-P models due to 
the use of lagged terms in the estimation of (9). 
15 The results are robust to different cutoff values for the outliers (0.5%, 1%, 2%), and also to different 
degrees for the polynomial expansion series (fourth and fifth degrees).   14
for the remaining of the analysis, the coefficients shown in the last two columns of 
Table 3 are used as the estimates for the bank production function. 
As discussed in section 3, it is important that monotonicity with respect to 
productivity holds for the communications input. If this assumption is violated, we 
cannot invert this function to express productivity as a function of observable variables. 
In order to check the validity of this assumption, communications was regressed on 
productivity and on the fixed inputs (capital and labor). All the estimated coefficients 
are positive and significant. 
Bank-level (log of) total factor productivity is computed as the difference 










l it it k c i l y β β β β ω − − − − =  
 
Aggregate bank productivity is calculated as the weighted bank-level 
productivity for each period, where the weight is given by the market share of each bank 
product in each time period. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the aggregate productivity 
alongside a more standard measure of productivity, namely labor productivity 
(calculated as the weighted average of  it it l y − ), both normalized to one in June 1990.
16 
 
                                                 
16 Both total factor productivity and labor productivity take the broader measure of output. Plots for the 
productivities using only assets as the measure of output give virtually the same display.   15
Figure 1: Brazilian banking system: total factor, and labor productivity 
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The two aggregate productivity measures display similar temporal patterns 
although their numerical scales differ. It is interesting to notice that labor productivity 
underestimates total factor productivity in banking, which is the opposite of what is 
found for the manufacturing sector in Brazil [Muendler (2002), Schor (2004)]. One 
possible reason for these differences may be related to a large fall in the capital stock in 
banking over the 1990’s, whereas the opposite is found in the manufacturing sectors in 
Brazil. 
Aggregate total factor productivity increases up to June 1997, remaining fairly 
flat after it. The accumulated productivity growth over the entire period is 13.46%, or an 
average annual growth rate of 1.02%. There is great heterogeneity across sub-periods 
though. In the period from June 1990 to June 1997, the average annual growth rate 
reached 2.36%. From June 1997 to December 2002, there is actually a small fall in the 
aggregate productivity: there is an accumulated fall of 3.61% or an average annual fall 
of 0.67%. 
Nakane (1999) found similar results through the estimation of cost functions for 
Brazilian banks accounting for efficiency according to the stochastic frontier   16
methodology
17. According to his estimation, the average cost efficiency index for 
Brazilian banks reached 0.4151 in the June 1990 to June 1994 period, and increased to 
0.5098 in the June 1994 to June 1997 period. Bevilaqua and Loyo (1998) also document 
cost efficiency gains for a panel of 38 Brazilian banks during the last quarter of 1994 
and the second quarter of 1998. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics for (the log of) total factor productivity 







All Banks - 244 banks, 4444 observations
TFP1 7.81 7.72 1.38 4.48 13.00
TFP2 7.81 7.72 1.37 4.54 12.99
Labor Productivity1 14.84 14.80 1.45 10.69 20.33
Labor Productivity2 14.85 14.81 1.45 10.71 20.33
TFP2 by Bank Size
1st Decile - 79 banks, 445 observations 7.09 7.11 0.87 4.82 10.56
2nd Decile - 98 banks, 445 observations 7.62 7.50 1.01 5.17 11.27
3rd Decile - 106 banks, 445 observations 7.84 7.77 1.15 4.54 11.55
4th Decile - 115 banks, 445 observations 7.96 7.98 1.38 4.77 12.36
5th Decile - 108 banks, 444 observations 8.29 8.39 1.41 4.85 11.98
6th Decile - 103 banks, 444 observations 8.09 8.33 1.42 4.93 11.68
7th Decile - 97 banks, 444 observations 8.06 8.41 1.50 5.12 11.97
8th Decile - 78 banks, 444 observations 8.11 8.29 1.57 5.24 12.56
9th Decile - 66 banks, 444 observations 7.90 7.59 1.48 5.38 12.99
10th Decile - 38 banks, 444 observations 7.18 6.92 1.25 5.19 11.84
TFP2 by Bank Ownership
State owned - 32 banks, 591 observations 6.29 6.36 0.62 4.54 8.58
Foreign - 71 banks, 996 observations 8.43 8.42 1.15 5.46 11.84
Domestic - 168 banks, 2857 observations 7.91 7.84 1.33 4.82 12.99
TFP2 for Privatized Banks - 14 banks
Privatized banks - 306 observations 6.39 6.37 0.71 4.85 8.58
Pre Privatization - 259 observations 6.25 6.28 0.64 4.85 8.58
Post Privatization - 47 observations 7.13 7.07 0.56 6.13 8.36
Labor Productivity2 is log of labor productivity when output is measured as the sum of total assets and services.
Bank size is measured as the sum of total assets and services.
TABLE 4 Descriptive Statistics for Productivity Scores
TFP1 is log of total factor productivity when output is measured as total assets.
TFP2 is log of total factor productivity when output is measured as the sum of total assets and services.
Labor Productivity1 is log of labor productivity when output is measured as total assets.
 
 
The average productivity scores have an inverted U shape across bank size. 
Small and large banks are the least productive ones. Bank total factor productivity 
increases steadily up to the 5th decile of bank size, decreasing for larger groups. 
                                                 
17 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a survey of efficiency studies applied to banking. 
18 We only report the results for the broader measure of output. The results are the same when the 
narrower measure is used.   17
When banks with different ownership structures are considered, state-owned 
banks form the least productive group, followed by the group of private domestic banks. 
Foreign-owned banks are the most productive group of banks. Finally, table 4 reports 
considerable improvements in productivity following privatization. 
The results shown in Table 4 should be interpreted as unconditional measures. In 
particular, no causal relations can be inferred from such figures. In the following 
section, we report regression results controlling for a rich set of explanatory variables. 
The main purpose is to uncover productivity differences accruing from corporate 
changes, especially changes related to bank privatization. 
 
 
6. Determinants of bank productivity 
 
This section attempts to study the determinants of bank productivity. Special 
attention is paid to the role of the ownership structure. In face of an environment 
whereby different corporate changes are affecting the industry, Berger et al. (2003) 
argue that it is important to control for as many of the changes as possible. In other 
terms, even if the primary interest of the paper relies on the effects of bank 
privatization, the introduction of controls for corporate changes that do not involve 
state-owned banks (e.g. domestic M&As or foreign acquisition of domestic banks) are 
overdue. 
Moreover, Berger et al. (2003) develop a framework where static, selection, and 
dynamic effects are contemplated. Static effects refer to the differences in performance 
for groups of banks that have not been involved in any corporate change. Selection 
effects are those related to the performance differentials for the groups of banks that 
were involved in some ownership change. Finally, dynamic effects capture the changes 
in performance for the last group of banks that are due to the change in ownership. This 
framework has been applied to study the Argentinean case by Berger et al. (2003), the 
Brazilian case by Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill (2003), and the Nigerian case by 
Beck, Cull, and Jerome (2003). 
The Brazilian case seems to be well suited for an application of this 
methodology. First, many corporate changes affected the banking industry in the 
1990’s, involving bank privatization, domestic M&As, foreign acquisition of domestic 
banks, and bank closures. Second, as documented in section 2, the process of bank   18
privatization was very rich in Brazil. Public banks owned by states were offered 
different solutions to their banks, including, liquidation, outright privatization, 
federalization followed by privatization, and restructuring. 
Static dummy variables were created for those banks that did not face any 
ownership change over the sample period and were still active by the end of the sample 
period. Two static dummy variables were created for state-owned banks (dstatic_state), 
and for foreign-controlled banks (dstatic_foreign). These dummy variables take the 
value one for the corresponding bank for all the time periods. Domestic private banks 
are the excluded reference group. 
Out of the 242 banks with observations in the sample
19, 112 (46.28%) of them 
were active by December 2002 without experiencing any corporate change. Five (2.07% 
of the total) of them were state-owned banks, 64 (26.45%) of them were domestic 
private banks, and 43 (17.77%) of them were foreign controlled banks.  
The relevance of each group of banks cannot be entirely gauged by their 
respective numbers due to the presence of many small banks. We therefore computed 
the market share of each group in December 2002. On this account, the group of 
commercial banks that have not experienced any corporate change responded for 
79.94% of the market share. The market shares accounted by state-owned banks, 
domestic private banks, and foreign controlled banks are, respectively, 32.52%, 28.25%, 
and 19.17%. 
Selection dummy variables were created for those banks that have faced some 
corporate change over the sample period. Four selection dummy variables were created 
for state-owned banks that were directly privatized (dselection_privatized), for state-
owned banks that were first federalized and later privatized 
(dselection_federalized_privatized)
20, for state-owned banks that were restructured and 
kept under state ownership (dselection_restructured), and for domestic private banks 
acquired by other private banks (dselection_domestic). The selection dummy variables 
take the value one for the corresponding banks during all the time periods.
21 
                                                 
19 See Appendix 1 for a list of all the banks included in the sample together with their organizational 
status and (when applicable) their status changes. Appendix 2 presents summary statistics for all the 
variables included in the regressions for the determinants of bank productivity. 
20 We also included in this group four state-owned banks that were federalized and have not been 
privatized by the end of the sample period. 
21 For some few banks, there was more than one change of control. In such cases, we followed Berger et 
al. (2003)’s procedure and only consider the last change.   19
Out of the 242 commercial banks in the sample, 55 (22.73%) of them have had 
some form of control change. State-owned banks account for 19 (7.85% of the total) of 
the cases with 7 privatized banks, 7 federalized and privatized banks, and 5 
reestructured state-owned banks.
22 Of the remaining 36 cases (14.88% of the total) 
involving private banks, half of them are cases of domestic banks merging with other 
domestic banks whereas the other half are situations where domestic banks are being 
acquired by foreign ones. In terms of market share, the group of banks that were 
involved in any form of corporate change accounted for 20.06% of the market in 
December 2002. The market shares of the state-owned banks, of the domestic banks 
acquired by other domestic banks, and of the domestic banks acquired by foreign banks 
are, respectively, of 9.51%, 5.17%, and 5.37%. 
Dynamic dummy variables were created for those banks for which the selection 
dummies were equal to one to date the precise moment when the ownership change 
occurred. Five dynamic dummy variables were created for state-owned banks that were 
straight privatized (ddynamic_privatized), for state-owned banks that were first 
federalized and later privatized dating the time of federalization 
(ddynamic_federalized_privatized_datefederalization), for state-owned banks that were 
first federalized and later privatized dating the time of privatization 
(ddynamic_federalized_privatized_dateprivatization), for state-owned banks that were 
restructured and kept under state ownership dating the time of restructuring 
(ddynamic_restructured), and for domestic private banks acquired by other private 
banks (ddynamic_domestic). The dynamic dummy variables take the value one for the 
corresponding banks for all the time periods following a certain intervention. 
The dynamic dummy variables capture the once-and-for-all changes associated 
to the interventions. However, in addition to this level effect, the interventions can have 
differentiated impacts over time. We therefore also created variables measuring the time 
lapsed since the intervention. Since we use 6-month observations in our sample, such 
variables are measured in semesters. Six time variables were created, one for each 
dynamic dummy variable. The labels for such variables follow the same pattern as the 
ones defined for the dynamic dummy variables with time replacing ddynamic. For 
example,  time_federalized_privatized_datefederalization measures the time since a 
state-owned bank that was federalized and privatized was federalized. Typically, the 
                                                 
22 A caveat is in order. The small number of privatized banks in the sample may harden the precise 
identification of the impacts of privatization on bank performance.   20
time variables take the value one in the semester when the intervention occurred, the 
value two in the following semester, and so on. 
We follow Berger et al. (2003) and actually exclude from the sample all 
observations for which the time variables equal one. In other terms, the semester during 
which the intervention occurred is not considered in the sample. The reason for this 
treatment is to try to control for noise introduced during the event of intervention, which 
usually produces some discontinuities in previous policies, involves legal costs 
associated to the intervention, etc. 
In addition to the static, selection, and dynamic variables we created another 
group of variables to deal with the banks that exited the market.
23 Typically, banks have 
left the market either because they were liquidated or because they changed their 
activities from commercial banking into something else. Accordingly, we defined three 
exit dummy variables for liquidated state-owned banks (dexit_liquidated_state), for 
liquidated private banks (dexit_liquidated_private), and for commercial banks that 
changed their activities (dexit_change). The exit dummy variables take the value one for 
the corresponding banks during all the periods for which they are present in the sample. 
Out of the 242 commercial banks present in our unbalanced sample, 75 
(30.99%) of them have exited the market. Six (2.48% of the total) state-owned banks 
were liquidated, 23 (9.50%) private banks were liquidated, and 46 (19.01%) commercial 
banks changed their activities. Obviously, the market share of the exited banks is zero 
by December 2002. 
In addition to the above mentioned variables we also included three additional 
control variables given by the lagged market share (market_share), as measured by the 
share of each bank output in the sector output in each period, lagged bank size given by 
the number of bank branches (branches), and lagged return (return), as measured by the 
ratio of pre tax profits to net worth. Time dummies were also included in the estimated 
regressions, with the aim of capturing macroeconomic effects not accounted for in the 
estimation. 
Table 5 presents four sets of results for the determinants of bank productivity. 
The reported results differ according to the two measures of output and according to 
whether the “time” variables capturing the effects of corporate changes over time are 
                                                 
23 Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill (2003) work with a balanced sample, excluding such banks from their 
analysis. We believe that keeping these banks in the sample is important to better deal with the sample 
selection problems discussed in section 3.   21
included or not. Robust standard errors are computed throughout. The coefficients of the 
time dummies are not reported to spare space. 
 
Variable
dstatic_state -1.0517*** -1.0517*** -1.0431*** -1.0430***
(0.0903) (0.0903) (0.0894) (0.0894)
dstatic_foreign 0.3229*** 0.3231*** 0.3209*** 0.3211***
(0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0492) (0.0493)
dexit_liquidated_state -1.9858*** -1.9861*** -1.9729*** -1.9732***
(0.1046) (0.1047) (0.1035) (0.1035)
dexit_liquidated_private -0.5634*** -0.5640*** -0.5638*** -0.5643***
(0.0792) (0.0796) (0.0789) (0.0793)
dexit_change 0.1314** 0.1308** 0.1306** 0.1301**
(0.0622) (0.0625) (0.0620) (0.0623)
dselection_privatized -1.3949*** -1.3957*** -1.3845*** -1.3853***
(0.0729) (0.0730) (0.0726) (0.0727)
dselection_federalized_privatized -1.6917*** -1.6924*** -1.6800*** -1.6807***
(0.0601) (0.0602) (0.0597) (0.0598)
dselection_restructured -1.3688*** -1.3696*** -1.3602*** -1.3610***
(0.0841) (0.0842) (0.0835) (0.0835)
dselection_domestic -0.0468 -0.0472 -0.0430 -0.0434
(0.0641) (0.0642) (0.0638) (0.0639)
ddynamic_privatized 0.4997*** 0.0390 0.4996*** 0.0364
(0.1137) (0.1710) (0.1126) (0.1698)
ddynamic_federalized_privatized_datefederalization -0.0578 0.0115 -0.0574 0.0157
(0.0818) (0.1668) (0.0811) (0.1652)
ddynamic_federalized_privatized_dateprivatization 0.3880** -0.3334 0.3856** -0.3220
(0.1857) (0.5332) (0.1824) (0.5211)
ddynamic_restructured -0.2359** -0.2216 -0.2319** -0.2200
(0.1092) (0.1971) (0.1086) (0.1958)
ddynamic_domestic 0.2819** 0.2847 0.2837** 0.2873











market_share 19.2719*** 19.2493*** 19.1296*** 19.1071***
(2.6595) (2.6575) (2.6396) (2.6376)
branches -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018***
(0.00015) (0.00015) (0.000015) (0.00015)
return 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062
(0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0091)
constant 7.1432*** 7.1436*** 7.1441*** 7.1444***
(0.1032) (0.1033) (0.1027) (0.1028)
Observations 4147 4147 4147 4147
R-squared 0.3673 0.3675 0.3668 0.3670
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
TFP1 is total factor productivity when output is measured as total assets.
TFP2 is total factor productivity when output is measured as the sum of total assets and services.
All specifications include semester fixed effects (not shown).
TABLE 5 - Determinants of Log(TFP)
TFP1 TFP2
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The two static dummy variables are highly significant in all specifications. The 
results show that state-owned banks are less productive than the private domestic ones 
(the reference group). On the other hand, foreign banks are more productive than the 
private domestic group. 
In addition to agency problems, one possible reason for the lower productivity of 
state-owned banks in Brazil is the “social” role they play as government agents. Thus, 
Banco do Brasil and CEF are major players in the concession of loans to the rural and to 
the low-income housing sector, respectively, usually at subsidized rates. 
The three exit dummy variables are significant in every specification and one of 
them is positive. State-owned liquidated banks have the poorest performance within this 
group, followed by the private liquidated banks. Commercial banks that left the market 
were actually more productive than the active private domestic banks (reference group). 
One possible reason for some banks to leave the market is related to the increasing costs 
of staying in the bank business related to more stringent prudent regulations as well as 
to the introduction of the new payment system in the country during 2002. 
Three of the four selection dummy variables are highly significant and negative 
in all specifications. In addition, these three selection variables are all related to state-
owned banks. Overall, state-owned banks that underwent some corporate change are 
less productive than private banks that also faced some corporate change. The selection 
coefficient is non-significant for the latter group, indicating that their productivity is no 
different than the productivity of the reference group (active domestic private banks). 
As for the state-owned banks, the group of banks that were first federalized and 
later privatized has the worst performance. Wald tests show that the coefficients for the 
selection variables for this group are significantly different than the coefficients for the 
other groups for all four specifications. 
The estimated coefficients for the static, exit, and selection dummy variables are 
quite robust to the different measures of output and to the inclusion of the “time” 
variables. On the other hand, the dynamic dummy variables differ markedly according 
to whether the “time” variables are included or not. When they are not included, only 
one out of the five dynamic dummy variables is not statistically significant. 
The most significant dynamic impacts we detected are related to bank 
privatization. Bank performance significantly improved after privatization. Moreover, 
the method of privatization does not seem to be relevant. Although the impacts of 
privatization are estimated to be greater for the banks that were straight privatized   23
(when compared to the banks that were first federalized and later privatized), the 
differences are not statistically significant.
24 
The other significant positive dynamic variable is associated to corporate 
changes involving only private banks. In other terms, private banks that were merged or 
acquired by other private banks have their performance improved following 
consolidation. 
Two of the dynamic variables are negatively signed with one of them being 
significant. Both of them are related to state-owned banks during periods of 
restructuring (either under federal or under state control). This result is not surprising 
because restructuring usually involves the transfer of troubled assets to the federal 
government. Since total assets are our measure of output, such banks may be facing a 
reduction in output while keeping unchanged their levels of inputs and therefore 
reducing their productivity. 
It is worth mentioning that the alternative of restructuring the state-owned bank 
and keeping it under state control does not seem to yield good results. Following their 
restructuring, the productivity of this group of banks has significantly decreased. 
Overall, the results suggest that dynamic effects associated both to bank 
privatization and to corporate control changes in the private sector worked towards 
improving the productivity of the involved banks. 
When the dynamic impacts of the corporate changes are allowed to take effect 
over time, only the groups of banks that were privatized showed significant 
improvements in productivity. In other terms, the impacts of bank privatization on 
productivity seem to spread out over many periods. And, again, the method of 
privatization does not seem to matter much. Although the coefficients on the “over 
time” effects of privatization are greater for the banks that were first federalized and 
then privatized, the differences are not statistically significant.
25 
With regard to the other control variables included in the regressions reported in 
Table 5, the results indicate a positive effect of lagged market share, a negative effect of 
the lagged number of branches on bank productivity, and non-significant impacts of the 
lagged return. These results change very little in the four specifications. The positive 
                                                 
24 The tests that the dynamic effects for state-owned banks that were straight privatized and for state-
owned banks that were first federalized and then privatized are equal give F statistics of 0.26 (p-value 
equal to 0.6070) in the regression for TFP1 and 0.28 (p-value equal to 0.5940) in the regression for TFP2. 
25 The tests that the “over time” effects for state-owned banks that were straight privatized and for state-
owned banks that were first federalized and then privatized are equal give F statistics of 1.44 (p-value 
equal to 0.2299) in the regression for TFP1 and 1.45 (p-value equal to 0.2293) in the regression for TFP2.   24
effect for market share suggests that the “quite life” hypothesis [Berger and Hannan 
(1998)], according to which banks with greater market power are less likely to take 
additional steps to be more productive, does not seem to be a good representation of the 
behavior of the Brazilian banks. Notice that the use of lagged market share helps to 
control for a possible reverse causality channel whereby more productive banks have an 
edge to increase their market shares. On the other hand, the negative effect for the 
number of bank branches may be pointing out to scale diseconomies. The operation of 
extensive branch networks can impart on productivity if the branches are small and 
geographically dispersed. 
Summing up, our results suggest that state-owned banks are less productive than 
their private peers. We also showed that privatization of state-owned banks improves 
productivity, regardless of the way the privatization takes place. In special, the 
beneficial effects of privatization are spread out over many periods. Finally, 
restructuring the state-owned banks and keeping it under state control does not seem to 





In the 1990s, the Brazilian banking sector underwent huge transformations. 
Following the control of the inflationary process, there was an intense wave of mergers 
and acquisitions, involving not only domestic agents but also foreign banks. Many state-
owned banks were privatized; some of them were closed down. Many troubled private 
banks also went bust. Improved bank regulation and supervision were also put into 
action. The purpose of this study was to evaluate how bank productivity was affected by 
these changes. Particular attention was paid to the effects of the privatization of state-
owned banks. 
The empirical sections of the paper made use of unbalanced panel data for 242 
commercial banks, observed twice a year, from December 1990 to December 2002. 
Bank-level productivity measures were obtained as the difference between actual and 
expected output, where the latter is the fitted value from the estimation of a production 
function. The estimated production function follows the strategy suggested by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to account for endogeneity problems.   25
In the second stage of the investigation, we tried to evaluate the role of some 
control variables on the level of bank productivity. Given the varied nature of corporate 
changes during the sample period, we follow Berger et al. (2003) and try to control for 
static, selection, and dynamic effects. We also include dummy variables controlling for 
exited banks. The results show a positive association between productivity and bank 
market share. It also shows negative effects from the number of bank branches on 
productivity. Moreover, state-owned banks seem to be less productive than their private 
competitors. Bank privatization had positive “over time” impact on productivity but 
restructuring the state-owned banks and keeping it under state control has negative 
effects on productivity. 
The way a state-owned bank is privatized does not seem to matter. Some state-
owned banks in Brazil were straight privatized by their former controllers whereas some 
other ones were first federalized and then privatized. The results show that the positive 
impacts of privatization do not differ for these two groups of banks. 
 
 
Appendix 1: List of the banks included in the sample 
 
Banks with no corporate change 
Bank Name  Status 
   
Banco do Brasil  State 
BASA Banco da Amazonia  State 
BNB Banco do Nordeste do Brasil  State 
BRB Banco de Brasília  State 
Caixa Econômica Federal  State 
Banco ABN AMRO Real  Foreign 
Banco American Express  Foreign 
Banco Barclays  Foreign 
Banco BNL do Brasil  Foreign 
Banco BNP Pariabas Brasil S. A.  Foreign 
Banco Citibank  Foreign 
Banco CNH Capital  Foreign 
Banco Comercial Uruguai  Foreign 
Banco Daimlerchrysler  Foreign 
Banco de la Nacion Argentina  Foreign 
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires  Foreign 
Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay  Foreign 
Banco de Tokyo-Mitsubishi Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Fiat  Foreign 
Banco Ford  Foreign   26
Banco General Motors  Foreign 
Banco Gerdau  Foreign 
Banco Honda  Foreign 
Banco HSBC  Foreign 
Banco J. P. Morgan  Foreign 
Banco KEB do Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Pottencial  Foreign 
Banco PSA Finance Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Rabobank International Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Sudameris Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Sumitomo Mitsui Brasileiro  Foreign 
Banco Toyota do Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Union Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Uno E - Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Volkswagen  Foreign 
Banco Volvo Brasil  Foreign 
Banco Westlb do Brasil  Foreign 
Bank of America  Foreign 
BankBoston Foreign 
BankBoston N.A.  Foreign 
Citibank N.A.  Foreign 
Deutsche Bank  Foreign 
Dresdner Bank Brasil  Foreign 
Dresdner Bank Lateinamerika Aktiengesellschaft  Foreign 
HSBC Bank Brasil  Foreign 
ING Bank N.V.  Foreign 
JP Morgan Chase Bank  Foreign 
Lloyds TSB Bank PLC  Foreign 
Banco A. J. Renner  Private domestic 
Banco ArbiI  Private domestic 
Banco BBM  Private domestic 
Banco BGN  Private domestic 
Banco BMC  Private domestic 
Banco BMG  Private domestic 
Banco Bonsucesso  Private domestic 
Banco Bradesco  Private domestic 
Banco BRJ  Private domestic 
Banco BVA  Private domestic 
Banco Cacique  Private domestic 
Banco Capital  Private domestic 
Banco Cedula  Private domestic 
Banco Classico  Private domestic 
Banco Cooperativo do Brasil  Private domestic 
Banco Cooperativo Sicredi  Private domestic 
Banco Credibel  Private domestic 
Banco Cruzeiro do Sul  Private domestic 
Banco Daycoval  Private domestic 
Banco Emblema  Private domestic 
Banco Fator  Private domestic 
Banco Fibra  Private domestic   27
Banco Ficsa  Private domestic 
Banco Guanabara  Private domestic 
Banco Industrial do Brasil  Private domestic 
Banco Industrial e Comercial  Private domestic 
Banco Indusval  Private domestic 
Banco Intercap  Private domestic 
Banco Itau  Private domestic 
Banco J. Safra  Private domestic 
Banco Luso Brasileiro  Private domestic 
Banco Matone  Private domestic 
Banco Máxima  Private domestic 
Banco Maxinvest  Private domestic 
Banco Mercantil do Brasil  Private domestic 
Banco Modal  Private domestic 
Banco Opportunity  Private domestic 
Banco Ourinvest  Private domestic 
Banco Pactual  Private domestic 
Banco Panamericano  Private domestic 
Banco Paulista  Private domestic 
Banco PEBB  Private domestic 
Banco Pecunia  Private domestic 
Banco Pine  Private domestic 
Banco Prosper  Private domestic 
Banco Rede  Private domestic 
Banco Rendimento  Private domestic 
Banco Ribeirão Preto  Private domestic 
Banco Rural  Private domestic 
Banco Rural Mais  Private domestic 
Banco Safra  Private domestic 
Banco Santos  Private domestic 
Banco Simples  Private domestic 
Banco Sofisa  Private domestic 
Banco Triangulo  Private domestic 
Banco Votorantim  Private domestic 
Banco VR  Private domestic 
Banco Zogbi  Private domestic 
Banco1.NET Private  domestic 
BancoSchahin Private  domestic 
BancoTricury Private  domestic 
Parana Banco  Private domestic 
Sterling Participações e Empreendimentos Private  domestic 
UNIBANCO União de Bancos Brasileiros  Private domestic 
 
Banks that changed corporate control 
Bank Name  Status  Date of Change of 
Status 
    
Banco BANEB  Straight Privatized  July 1999 
Banco BANERJ  Straight Privatized  July 1997 
Banco BANESTADO  Straight Privatized  October 2000   28
Banco BEMGE  Straight Privatized  September 1998 
Banco de Credito Real de Minas 
Gerais  Straight Privatized  January 1998 
Banco de Pernanbuco – 
BANDEPE  Straight Privatized  November 1998 
PARAIBAN - Banco da Paraiba  Straight Privatized  November 2001 
Banco BEA  Federalized and Privatized  Federalized in Oct 99; 
Privatized in Feb 02 
Banco BEG  Federalized and Privatized  Federalized in Oct 99; 
Privatized in Dec 01 
Banco BEM  Federalized and Privatized  Federalized in Sep 00 
Banco do Estado de Santa 
Catarina  Federalized and Privatized  Federalized in Sep 00 
Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo 
– BANESPA  Federalized and Privatized  Federalized in Dec 97; 
Privatized in Nov 00 
Banco do Estado do Ceara – 
BEC  Federalized and Privatized  Federalized in Oct 99 
Banco do Estado do Piaui – 
BEPI  Federalized and Privatized  Federalized in Mar 00 
Banco do Estado de Sergipe  Reestructured  4th Quarter 1998 
Banco do Estado do Para  Reestructured  4th Quarter 1998 
Banco do Estado do Rio Grande 
do Sul  Reestructured 1st  Quarter  1998 
Banco Nossa Caixa  Reestructured  4th Quarter 2000 
BANESTES Banco do Estado 
do Espirito Santo  Reestructured  4th Quarter 1997 
American Express Bank  Domestic to Private  November 1998 
Banco ABC Brasil  Domestic to Private  December 1997 
Banco Alvorada  Domestic to Private  October 1998 
Banco Banif Primus  Domestic to Private  December 1999 
Banco BBM  Domestic to Private  April 1998 
Banco BCN  Domestic to Private  January 1998 
Banco Boavista Interatlantico  Domestic to Private  December 2000 
Banco Brascan  Domestic to Private  March 1998 
Banco Calyon Brasil  Domestic to Private  November 2001 
Banco Cidade  Domestic to Private  June 2002 
Banco Cindam  Domestic to Private  May 1997 
Banco Comercial e de 
Investimento Sudameris  Domestic to Private  July 1998 
Banco Credibanco  Domestic to Private  April 2000 
Banco Credit Suisse First 
Boston  Domestic to Private  October 1998 
Banco das Nações  Domestic to Private  December 2000 
Banco Dibens  Domestic to Private  August 1998 
Banco Digibanco  Domestic to Private  December 1995 
Banco Finasa  Domestic to Private  June 1999 
Banco Fininvest  Domestic to Private  April 2002 
Banco Frances e Brasileiro  Domestic to Private  July 1995 
Banco GE Capital  Domestic to Private  January 1999 
Banco Inter-Atlantico  Domestic to Private  March 1998 
Banco Itabanco  Domestic to Private  January 1998 
Banco Itau-BBA  Domestic to Private  November 2002   29
Banco John Deere  Domestic to Private  September 1999 
Banco Mercantil de Sao Paulo  Domestic to Private  March 2002 
Banco Real  Domestic to Private  November 1999 
Banco Santander  Domestic to Private  May 2000 
Banco Santander Brasil  Domestic to Private  August 1997 
Banco Santander Meridional  Domestic to Private  May 2000 
Banco Santander Noroeste  Domestic to Private  March 1998 
Banco Societe Generale Brasil  Domestic to Private  October 1999 
Banco UBS  Domestic to Private  September 1998 
Bank of America - Liberal  Domestic to Private  October 2002 
BCR Banco de Credito Real  Domestic to Private  July 1998 
Unicard Banco Multiplo  Domestic to Private  January 2001 
 
Banks that exited the sample 
Bank Name  Status  Exit Date 
    
Banco do Estado de Alagoas  Exit Liquidated State  July 1997 
Banco do Estado de Mato Grosso  Exit Liquidated State  October 1998 
Banco do Estado de Rondonia  Exit Liquidated State  August 1998 
Banco do Estado de Roraima  Exit Liquidated State  December 1999 
Banco do Estado do Acre  Exit Liquidated State  June 1999 
Banco do Estado do Amapa  Exit Liquidated State  September 1997 
Banco Aplicap  Exit Liquidated Private  January 1998 
Banco Araucaria  Exit Liquidated Private  March 2001 
Banco Bamerindus do Brasil  Exit Liquidated Private  April 1997 
Banco BMD  Exit Liquidated Private  October 1998 
Banco Brasileiro Comercial  Exit Liquidated Private  May 1998 
Banco Brasileiro-Iraquiano  Exit Liquidated Private  May 1998 
Banco Crefisul  Exit Liquidated Private  March 1999 
Banco Empresarial  Exit Liquidated Private  May 1997 
Banco Financial Portugues  Exit Liquidated Private  April 2002 
Banco Hexabanco  Exit Liquidated Private  July 2000 
Banco Interfinance  Exit Liquidated Private  August 1997 
Banco Interior de Sao Paulo  Exit Liquidated Private  February 2001 
Banco Interpart  Exit Liquidated Private  March 2001 
Banco Lavra  Exit Liquidated Private  April 2000 
Banco Martinelli  Exit Liquidated Private  October 1999 
Banco Pontual  Exit Liquidated Private  October 1999 
Banco Porto Seguro  Exit Liquidated Private  August 1997 
Banco Santander Central Hispano  Exit Liquidated Private  May 2000 
Banco Santander de Negocios  Exit Liquidated Private  August 2001 
Banco Vega  Exit Liquidated Private  May 1997 
Bancos Santos Neves  Exit Liquidated Private  August 2001 
BANFORT - Banco Fortaleza  Exit Liquidated Private  May 1997 
Milbanco  Exit Liquidated Private  November 1998 
Banco Axial  Exit Changed  January 2001 
Banco Bancred  Exit Changed  January 1998 
Banco Boreal  Exit Changed  January 2002 
Banco Cambial  Exit Changed  February 1998   30
Banco Chase Fleming  Exit Changed  December 2001 
Banco Credito Metropolitano  Exit Changed  Januray 1998 
Banco Criterium  Exit Changed  November 1997 
Banco Destak  Exit Changed  June 1999 
Banco Dimensao  Exit Changed  December 1997 
Banco Equatorial  Exit Changed  June 2000 
Banco Euroinvest - Eurobanco  Exit Changed  January 2002 
Banco Exprinter Losan  Exit Changed  March 99 
Banco Fenicia  Exit Changed  December 1999 
Banco Ficrisa Axelrud  Exit Changed  November 2002 
Banco Finansinos  Exit Changed  April 2002 
Banco Fital  Exit Changed  October 1998 
Banco Fonte Cindam  Exit Changed  December 2000 
Banco Frances Internacional Brasil  Exit Changed  October 2001 
Banco Gulfinvest  Exit Changed  December 1997 
Banco HNF  Exit Changed  March 1999 
Banco Icatu  Exit Changed  October 2001 
Banco Induscred  Exit Changed  April 2002 
Banco Investor  Exit Changed  September 1995 
Banco Iochpe  Exit Changed  February 1998 
Banco Itamarati  Exit Changed  December 1997 
Banco Marka  Exit Changed  January 2001 
Banco Matrix  Exit Changed  December 2000 
Banco Merrill Lynch  Exit Changed  December 2002 
Banco Minas  Exit Changed  September 2000 
Banco Misasi  Exit Changed  July 1996 
Banco Multiplic  Exit Changed  August 1998 
Banco Norchem  Exit Changed  July 1997 
Banco OK  Exit Changed  July 1996 
Banco Patente  Exit Changed  December 1999 
Banco Performance  Exit Changed  November 1996 
Banco Porto Real  Exit Changed  September 2001 
Banco Prime  Exit Changed  December 1995 
Banco Regional Malcon  Exit Changed  December 2001 
Banco Royal  Exit Changed  December 1997 
Banco Sistema  Exit Changed  September 2002 
Banco Tecnicorp  Exit Changed  August 1999 
Banco Tendencia  Exit Changed  December 2001 
Banco Theca  Exit Changed  July 2001 
Banco Wachovia  Exit Changed  April 2002 
HSBC Investment Bank Brasil  Exit Changed  March 2002 
HSBC Republic Bank Brasil  Exit Changed  December 2001 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics for the sample variables 
TABLE 6 - Sample summary 
         
Variable  Mean Median Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Production Function - 4444 obs.               
Assets* 5,001  557.5  18,511  0.680  206,047 
Assets+Services* 5,050  561.8  18,703  0.680  207,895 
Employees 3,261  129  12,381  2  136,587 
Capital* 123.9  7.268  648.2  0.00235  13,890 
Other intermediate inputs*  21.27  1.067  78.85  0.00240  972.3 
Communications* 6.712  0.464  25.34  0.000370  314.3 
                 
Determinants of Productivity - 4202 obs.             
TFP1 7,123  2,291  18,316  88.11  441,776 
TFP2 7,103  2,311  18,192  93.51  438,587 
Market share  0.59%  0.073% 2.25%  0.00012%  44.17% 
Number of branches  94.77  3  347.3  0  3282 
Return on net worth  0.206  0.098  2.564  -51.15  146.9 
Dummy static state  0.0283  0  0.1659  0  1 
Dummy static foreign  0.1735  0  0.3787  0  1 
Dummy static domestic private  0.2980  0  0.4574  0  1 
Dummy exit liquidated state  0.0181  0  0.1333  0  1 
Dummy exit liquidated private  0.0728  0  0.2599  0  1 
Dummy exit liquidated change  0.1416  0  0.3487  0  1 
Dummy selection privatized  0.0319  0  0.1757  0  1 
Dummy selection federalized 
privatized  0.0376 0  0.1903  0  1 
Dummy selection restructured  0.0288  0  0.1673  0  1 
Dummy selection domestic  0.1694  0  0.3752  0  1 
Dummy dynamic privatized  0.0093  0  0.0959  0  1 
Dummy dynamic federalized 
privatized date federalization  0.0105 0  0.1018  0  1 
Dummy dynamic federalized 
privatized date privatization  0.0019 0  0.0436  0  1 
Dummy dynamic restructured  0.0081  0  0.0896  0  1 
Dummy dynamic domestic  0.0462  0  0.2099  0  1 
Time since privatized**  0.0433  0  0.5241  0  11 
Time federalized privatized since 
date federalization**  0.0412 0  0.4623  0  10 
Time federalized privatized since 
date privatization**  0.0050  0  0.1281  0  5 
Time since restructured**  0.0348  0  0.4426  0  9 
Time since domestic change**  0.2270  0  1.1387  0  11 
*  in million of Reais (December 2002 values). 
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